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This paper provides new evidence on the unique role 
of trade credit and contracting terms as a way for both 
sellers and buyers to mange business risk. The authors 
use a novel and unique dataset on almost 30,000 supplier 
contracts for 56 large buyers and more than 24,000 
suppliers in Europe and North America. The sample 
of buyers and suppliers includes firms of varying size, 
investment grade, and sectors. The paper finds evidence 
in support of four important, and not mutually exclusive, 
reasons for trade credit: 1) as a method of financing; 
2) as a means of price discrimination; 3) as a bond 
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assuring buyers of product quality; and 4) as a screening 
mechanism to gauge buyer default risk. In particular, 
the analysis finds that the largest and most creditworthy 
buyers receive contracts with the longest maturities, as 
measured by net days, from smaller, investment grade 
suppliers. In comparison, early payment discounts 
seem to be used as a risk management tool to limit the 
potential nonpayment risk of trade credit. Early payment 
discounts are generally offered to smaller, non-investment 
grade buyers. The results suggest that contract terms are 
jointly determined by supplier and buyer characteristics. 
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Trade credit is an important source of external financing for both small and large firms around 
the world (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 2005).  For instance, firms often offer working 
capital financing to their customers, reported as accounts receivables, even if they are small or 
credit constrained (McMillan and Woodruff 1999, Marotta 2005, and Van Horen 2005).  
Trade credit might also be available when other forms of financing are not.  For instance, 
during periods of contractions in bank credit (say, due to monetary tightening or bank distress), 
buyers might depend more on trade credit for short-term financing as a response to credit market 
tightening, and this may be especially true for small firms (see, for example, Himmelberg et al. 
1995, Choi and Kim, 2005, and Love et al. 2007).   
Trade credit is also thought of as a way for a supplier to engage in price discrimination, 
giving favored or more powerful clients longer terms (see, for example, Wilner 2000, Fisman 
and Raturi 2004, Van Horen 2005, and Burkart, Ellingsen, and Giannetti, 2008).   
Furthermore, trade credit may simply be customary in an industry, with customs driven 
by economic rationales such as allowing buyers time to check out the quality of the supplied 
goods (Lee and Stowe, 1993). 
Studies have explored the supply and demand of trade credit around the world (for 
instance, Petersen and Rajan 1997, Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff 2002, Boissay and Gropp 
2007, and Fabbri and Klapper 2008).  Yet, even the stylized facts on how the contract terms of 
trade credit vary across buyers and suppliers of different characteristics are poorly understood, in 
part because firm-level contract-level data have not been easily available.  For example, what is 
the typical duration for which trade credit is offered? Who is offered a longer time to pay? 
Which firms are offered early payment discounts?  By whom?  
This paper addresses these questions using a unique database that includes detailed 
contract information for about 30,000 transactions for 53 large buyers in the United States and 
Europe.  We summarize typical trade credit terms and how they relate to buyer and seller 
characteristics.  We also study the use of early payment discounts. We then draw some   3
conclusions on the robustness of theories that might have some merit in explaining the patterns 
in the data. 
Empirical work on trade credit thus far has been hampered due to a lack of firm-level data 
on trade credit contract terms. Most studies have used the Federal Reserve Survey of Small 
Business Financing (SSBF) database of U.S. firms, which has only limited data on credit terms 
and firm characteristics (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1997, and Burkart et al., 2008).  
An exception is Ng et al. (1999) who use survey level data on 950 listed U.S. firms to 
study the determinants and characteristics of trade credit contracts. They document wide 
variation across industries in credit terms, and find that variables capturing buyer and seller 
reputation are significant determinants of a firm’s choice to extend credit, consistent with 
theories that explain credit terms as contractual solutions to information problems concerning 
product quality and buyer creditworthiness. 
Our paper differs from the work by Ng et al. (1999) in several important ways. First, we 
use unique data on actual trade credit contracts rather than survey based data. Second, we cover a 
broader set of industries that includes technology firms. Third, our dataset includes trade credit 
terms not only for US firms but also for international firms. Fourth, we have bilateral contract 
information, so we can control both for buyer and supplier firm characteristics. Fifth, and 
importantly, we have multiple contracts for the same firm, rather than a firm-average response, 
allowing us to include firm fixed effects in our empirical analysis, thereby abstracting from time-
invariant firm characteristics that determine the choice of credit terms. Finally, another important 
distinction is that the Ng et al. data covers only large, publicly traded firms while our dataset 
includes suppliers of all size. This is an important difference because the credit terms offered by 
large firms are likely to be very different than those by small firms, especially when credit is 
extended by small suppliers to large buyers.  
In short, the bilateral, multi-contract nature of our dataset is truly unique and is a major 
improvement on datasets that have previously been used to study the determinants of credit terms 
used in trade credit. This multi-contract structure of our dataset allows us to abstract from 
unobserved buyer and supplier firm characteristics, something previous empirical work has not 
been able to do.   4
Using this unique dataset, we find that the largest and most creditworthy buyers receive 
contracts with the longest maturities, as measured by net days, from smaller, investment grade 
suppliers.  In comparison, early payment discounts seem to be used as a risk management tool to 
limit the potential nonpayment risk of trade credit.  In particular, early payment discounts are 
generally offered to smaller and non-investment grade buyers, where nonpayment risk tends to 
be greater. Our results suggest that contract terms are jointly determined by supplier and buyer 
characteristics.  
The paper continues as follows. Section II presents summary statistics of our unique data 
on trade credit contracts. Section III reviews theories of trade credit. Section IV presents the 
empirical results. Section V concludes. 
II.  Data and Summary Statistics 
We use a novel database of trade credit contracts for close to the universe of suppliers of 56 large 
buyers.
1 The data are provided by PrimeRevenue, an online network that links large, global 
companies, their suppliers, and third-party financial institutions, via the Internet.  PrimeRevenue 
provides software and an IT platform for buyers to post their invoices directly; and suppliers to 
choose whether to be paid at maturity of the contract or to factor the contract and be paid 
immediately at a discount.  
Our data are a snapshot of outstanding receivables as of December 1, 2005.  Importantly, 
this snapshot is before PrimeRevenue started factoring the receivables. Buyers generally post 
invoices for all ‘important’ suppliers, which is estimated by PrimeRevenue to capture over 90% 
of total inputs to the buyer.  Our database includes information for 29,019 contracts, which 
includes 56 large buyers and 24,140 suppliers. This includes multiple supplier contracts within 
and across buyers. 
The data include complete information on contract terms:  spend (contract amount), net 
days (days within which the buyer has to pay the amount owed), discount days (days within 
                                                           
1Because purchasing history is proprietary information, we do not know the identity of buyers in our sample.  
However, as discussed in this section, PrimeRevenue provided us with buyer characteristics (such as size, sector, 
and location) and the fact that almost all buyers in our sample are Fortune 500 .   5
which the buyer has to pay to get the full discount), discount rate (the size of the discount if the 
amount is paid by the discount date), and currency.   
For buyers, we can control for asset size (buckets)
2, location (North America or Europe), 
sector, and whether the buyer is investment grade.  For suppliers, we know the asset size 
(bucket) and whether the supplier is investment grade.  Information is not provided on the 
suppliers’ location or sector, since most contracts are written to a local distributor and/or paid to 
a local bank account.   
We impute additional variables such as the total buyer spend (as measured by the total 
dollar amount of contracts entered into) and number of suppliers, and the ratio of spend on a 
particular supplier to total buyer spend as indicators of the overall importance of the supplier to 
the buyer’s supply chain. Apart from missing information about net days for 832 out of 29,019 
contracts, we have complete information on contract terms. 
We begin by summarizing the main characteristics of buyers, suppliers, and contracts.  
Table 1 shows summary statistics of buyer and supplier characteristics.  First, the buyers in our 
sample are very large – we find that 84% of buyers (weighted by number of contracts) have over 
US$ 10 billion in sales and less than 1% of buyers have less than US$ 2 billion in sales.   
The buyers are also creditworthy as measured by whether or not they are investment 
grade – about 84% of buyers in the dataset are investment grade.   
Buyers are active in a range of industries, with the majority in retail industries. The 
sectoral distribution in terms of number of contracts is: 6% in auto manufacturing, 34% in 
diversified retail, 13% in diversified manufacturing, 6% in retail groceries, 11% in retail hard 
goods, 8% in retail soft goods, 18% in technology, 2% in food and beverages, and 2% in the 
utility sector. The data encompasses only one firm in the utility sector and two firms in the food 
and beverages sector.  
Approximately 59% of buyers (weighted by the number of contracts) are from North 
America (the US or Canada) and 41% of buyers are from Europe.  
                                                           
2 Buyer and supplier size buckets are (in US$): less than $.1 billion; $0.1-2 billion; $2-7 billion; $7-10 billion; larger 
than $7 billion.   6
In comparison to the buyers, our suppliers are relatively small: Almost half the suppliers 
(weighted by the number of contracts) have less than US$ 100 million in sales and only 20% of 
suppliers have more than US$ 2 billion in sales. Creditworthiness is also an issue for many 
suppliers, given that almost two-thirds of suppliers are not investment grade. 
Table 2, Panel A shows summary statistics of contract characteristics.  We have a wide 
distribution of contract amounts varying from about US$ 400 dollars to over US$ 6.5 billion 
dollars.  Contracts in our sample are generally very long in duration – the average and median is 
60 net days.  About 75% of contracts in our sample have net days longer than 30 days, which is 
longer than the ‘typical’ contract of 30 days previously shown in the literature (Ng, Smith and 
Smith 1999).  For example, 20% of contracts have net days of exactly 30 days, 28% have net 
days of exactly 60 days, and 17% have net days of exactly 75 days. 
About 60% of contracts in our sample are denominated in US dollars, followed by almost 
40% in euros; this is approximately consistent with the distribution of buyers in Europe and 
North America (41% and 59%, respectively, as shown in Table 1). 
In our sample, 13% of contracts (or 3,717 in total) offer early payment discounts.
3 Panel 
B of Table 2 shows summary statistics for this subsample of contracts.  We also examine the 
discount terms, including discount days and discount rate.  Almost two-thirds of discount terms 
are 30 days or less, while 27% are between 30 and 60 days, and 9% are more than 60 days.  For 
example, 20% of discount days are 10 days, 20% are 30 days, and 16% are 60 days.  The 
majority of contracts have a spread of net days less discount days equal to 20 or 30 days (15% 
and 27%, respectively).  The mean ratio of discount to net days is 63%.  
There is a surprising relationship between net days and discount days – over 30% of 
contracts have a spread of exactly one day.  This might suggest that discounts can be used simply 
to encourage prompt payments, or as an implicit price discount, i.e. an alternative to a cut in list 
prices.
4 The mean and median discount is equal to 2%, and 36% of contracts with a discount 
have a discount rate equal to 1% or less; and only 8% of contracts with a discount have a 
discount greater than 2%.  
                                                           
3 This is a comparable figure to that obtained using SSBF survey data on U.S. firms, indicating that 20% of firms 
that use trade credit are offered an early payment discount from their suppliers. 
4 Anecdotally, large buyers do not pay late fees to their suppliers.   7
Trade credit appears expensive for most buyers. The mean effective interest rate, defined 
as the implied interest rate if the buyer does not pay on the discount date, foregoes the discount, 
and pays on the due date, is  1 ) 1 ( 1
) /( 360  
 days discount days net rate discount . It is high at 53%, 
though it varies from a low of 2% to a high of 100%. 
Table 3 shows the distribution of contract terms by buyer and supplier characteristics.  
Larger buyers tend to make purchases with a wider range of spend, including more frequent 
relatively small purchases of less than US$ 1 million in size.  Across industries, auto 
manufacturing and retail hard goods have relatively larger average spend, especially relative to 
technology, where almost 75% of contracts are less than US$ 1 million in size.  We find no 
notable differences in spend size across buyer location or investment grade.  In addition, large 
suppliers appear to make large sales (and vice versa), while whether a supplier is investment 
grade does not seem related to average spend. 
We also examine the relationship between contract maturity and buyer and seller 
characteristics.  We find that the number of net days offered is almost twice as long if the buyer 
is investment grade, although supplier creditworthiness seems to have no effect on the number of 
net days offered.  We find strong sectoral effects:  85% of contracts in retailing of soft goods 
have a maturity of 30 days or less, relative to other sectors with longer average maturities.    
Contracts to firms in Europe are on average longer than contracts in North America (although the 
sectoral distribution is relatively even across regions).  Finally, contracts to the largest and most 
creditworthy buyers receive longer maturities. 
Next, we focus on the decision to extend early payment discounts (Table 4).  Overall, 
13% of buyers (and 13% of contracts) are offered early payment discounts.  In general, the 
buyers receiving a discount are small and non-investment grade, while suppliers offering a 
discount tend to be larger and are roughly equally likely to be investment or non-investment 
grade.  Suppliers are also most likely to offer discounts to buyers that retail in hard goods.  In 
addition, eight buyers are never offered discounts, while 21 buyers are always offered discounts. 
In the empirical analysis of this paper we therefore also check how the results look if we drop the 
firms who never report discounts.   8
Discounts do not appear strongly related to buyer or supplier characteristics, with the 
exception that very high discounts are more common in the auto industry and among grocery 
firms.  Discount days, the number of days the buyer has to pay and receive a discount, appears 
strongly related to buyer size – 78% of firms with less than US$ 10 billion in total sales have 
discount days of 30 or less, while only about 64% of firms larger than US$ 10 billion in size 
receive a short discount window.  The mean of net days is 60 days for contracts without 
discounts and 44 days for contracts with discounts, suggesting that suppliers trade discounts for 
net days. 
Importantly, our database also allows for both supplier and buyer fixed effects.  About 
25% of suppliers (or 7,273 suppliers) sell to multiple buyers. Of these, 3,126 suppliers sell to 2 
buyers and 4,147 suppliers sell to 3 or more buyers. In addition, 16% of suppliers (or 4,557 
suppliers) have more than one contract with the same buyer. Specifically, 2,685 suppliers have 
exactly 2 contracts with a buyer, and 1,872 suppliers have 3 or more contracts with a buyer.  In 
general, we find variation in net days and the decision to extend an early payment discount 
across contracts of a single supplier. 
III.  Theories of Trade Credit 
Before we explore the data econometrically, it might be useful to outline various theories of trade 
credit and formulate some testable hypotheses.  Much of the work on trade credit has seen it as a 
form of financing that can overcome traditional impediments in financing. In particular, the 
seller may know more about, and have more clout over, the buyer than other arm’s length 
financiers (see, for example, Smith, 1987, Brennan et al., 1988, Petersen and Rajan, 1997, Biais 
and Gollier, 1997, and Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). Therefore trade credit may be available 
when other forms of financing are not. Much of this literature argues that large suppliers have a 
comparative advantage in obtaining outside finance and pass on this advantage to small, credit 
constrained firms (e.g., Boissay and Gropp, 2007). Similarly, large suppliers may act also as 
liquidity providers, insuring against liquidity shocks that could endanger the survival of their 
customer relationships with smaller firms (see, for example, Cunat, 2006).   9
Nevertheless, it is clear from previous studies and our own, that trade credit is not only 
used to finance credit constrained firms.
5 For instance, large, listed, multinational firms around 
the world, which are unlikely to face financing constraints in the market, hold large volumes of 
accounts payable on their balance sheet (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005).  Globally, 
it is estimated that trade credit financed 90% of world merchandise trade in 2007, valued at about 
US$ 25 trillion dollars.
6 
Why might large, investment grade buyers choose to use trade credit financing? One 
answer is that their suppliers may have cheaper access to financing, and a comparative advantage 
in passing it on (see Ng et al., 1999).   However, as shown in our data set, most suppliers are 
much smaller than their buyers, and are unlikely to have access to cheaper financing.     
Another possible explanation is that large buyers receive very favorable contract terms, 
which reduce their overall borrowing costs. Why small suppliers may want to borrow at high 
cost in order to provide such cheap financing seems less clear – could they not simply offer more 
of a price discount up front, without incurring the deadweight costs of intermediation?  
One explanation may be that a country’s laws may not allow a vendor to offer different 
prices to different clients.
 7 To the extent that price discrimination is prohibited, variations in 
trade credit terms also offer opportunities for sellers to offer better terms to more important 
suppliers (e.g., Brennan et al. 1988).  This is consistent with the literature that large buyers can 
use their market power to demand favorable trade credit terms from their suppliers (see, for 
example, Burkart, Ellingsen, and Giannetti, 2008, and Fabbri and Klapper 2008).   
Trade credit might also be used as a risk management mechanism to reduce informational 
asymmetries between buyers and sellers. Such risk management can either serve to assure 
product quality or to gauge buyer default risk.  
                                                           
5 In fact, Schiff and Lieber (1974) argue that risk management and inventory management decisions are often taken 
separately from financing decisions and by different units of the firm, and that consequently trade credit cannot be 
solely explained on financing grounds. 
6 “World Bank urged to lift trade credit finance,” Financial Times, November 11, 2008. 
7 For example, the Clayton Act in the US prohibits price discrimination across customers for the same good.   10
In terms of reducing uncertainty concerning product quality prior to payment, buyers 
might demand a credit period. This may be particularly relevant in cross-border sales between 
different jurisdictions. In this case, trade credit does not play a financing role but can be seen as a 
warranty that guarantees product quality (see, for example, Lee and Stowe, 1993, and Long et al., 
1993). The credit period offers the buyer time to test the quality of the product before deciding 
whether or not to make payment and accept the merchandise. Alternatively, buyers that take cash 
discounts and pay early effectively bear product risk. 
Trade credit can also be offered by suppliers as a screening mechanism to gauge buyer 
default risk (see, for example, Mian and Smith, 1992, and Frank and Maksimovic, 2005). In 
particular, sellers can reduce payment risks through two-part payment terms, such as early 
payment discounts (e.g., Ng et al., 1999). Alternatively, suppliers with high borrowing costs 
might offer an early payment discount to reduce the need to finance their own extension of trade 
credit to buyers. 
In sum then, we see four important, and not mutually exclusive, reasons for trade credit: 
1) As a method of financing; 2) As a means of price discrimination or market power; 3) As a 
bond assuring buyers of product quality; 4) As a screening mechanism to gauge buyer default 
risk.  
These four reasons offer several testable hypotheses, not all of which are mutually 
exclusive.  
Hypothesis 1: Suppliers in industries with substantial turnover and perishable goods 
extend shorter net days.   
This is consistent with both the financing and bonding explanations.  
Hypothesis 2: Smaller suppliers extend longer net days.  
This is consistent with both a market power explanation (small suppliers are squeezed more by 
buyers) and a bonding explanation (small suppliers have to offer better bonds). 
Hypothesis 3: Larger suppliers extend longer net days. 
This is consistent with a financing explanation (large suppliers have lower financing costs).   11
Hypothesis 4: Investment grade suppliers extend longer net days.  
This is consistent with a financing explanation (the cost of finance is less for investment grade 
suppliers, allowing them to offer longer terms), a buyer market power explanation (suppliers for 
whom providing credit costs less may be squeezed for more), and a bonding explanation (in 
order to signal commitment to quality, an investment grade supplier who can raise finance at 
lower cost will offer longer terms). 
Hypothesis 5: Large buyers receive longer net days. 
This is consistent with both a market power explanation (suppliers are squeezed more by large 
buyers) and a screening explanation (large buyers have lower default risk and need not be 
screened as much). 
Hypothesis 6: Investment grade buyers receive longer net days. 
This is consistent with a screening explanation (investment-grade buyers have lower default risk 
and need not be screened as much). 
Hypothesis 7: Discounts are more common for small and non-investment grade buyers. 
This is consistent with the screening explanation (early payment discounts offer suppliers a 
screening mechanism to gauge buyer default risk). 
Hypothesis 8: Discounts are more common from small suppliers. 
This is consistent with the market power hypothesis (large buyers demand discounts from small 
suppliers) and the screening explanation (it is more difficult for small suppliers to absorb and 
diversify default risk). 
Table 5 summarizes these testable hypotheses for different trade credit terms: net days 
versus discount offered. Panel A summarizes the role of supplier and buyer characteristics in 
explaining differences in contract maturity as measured by the net days, and shows whether 
under each of the four different explanations for trade credit the effect on net days is positive, 
negative or zero. Panel B summarizes the role of supplier and buyer characteristics in explaining 
whether or not early payment discounts are offered, and shows whether under each of the four   12
different explanations for trade credit the effect on the likelihood of discounts is positive, 
negative, or zero. 
With these eight possible explanations and testable hypotheses in mind, let us examine 
the data more carefully.   
IV.  Regression Analysis  
In this section, we use a multivariate framework to study the determinants of contract terms.   
Summary statistics and definitions of all variables are shown in Table 6.   Our first 
dependent variable is the contract maturity, measured as the log number of net days.  The strict 
financing explanation would suggest that large, investment grade suppliers (who have easier 
access to credit) should offer longer terms to small, non-investment grade buyers. The price 
discrimination cum bargaining power explanation would suggest that larger buyers should obtain 
more credit from smaller suppliers. The view that trade credit is posted as a bond assuring 
product quality would suggest that smaller suppliers (who typically have less of a history and 
reputation) should offer longer terms, while buyer size should not matter.    
We include supplier and buyer characteristics as explanatory variables.  We include an 
indicator if the buyer is big (above $ 10 billion in sales), as well as an indicator if the buyer has 
an investment grade rating. Similarly, we include an indicator if the supplier is large (above $ 2 
billion in sales), an indicator if the supplier is medium sized (between $ 100 million and $ 2 
billion in sales), as well as an indicator if the supplier is investment grade. We also include 
indicators for the buyer’s industry.    
Correlation matrices of all variables are shown for the full sample and subsample of 
contracts that offer a pre-payment discount in Table 7. Although there are significant 
relationships between our explanatory variables, the correlation levels are generally sufficiently 
low to eliminate concerns of cross-correlation among variables.   
Our first results are shown in Table 8.  The first two columns cluster standard errors by 
buyer, while the next two columns include buyer fixed effects, and the last two columns include 
supplier fixed effects.  The second columns in each of these pairs excludes credit contracts with   13
discounts to abstract from the possibility that net days on two-part contracts vary systematically 
from those of simple contracts without discounts. Our industry classifications are very broad. 
Nevertheless, we find buyers in industries with substantial turnover (groceries, soft goods), and 
where goods are more likely to be perishable, tend to have shorter net days.
8 This is consistent 
with both the financing and bonding explanations.  
Perhaps most interestingly, we find that longer net days are offered to significantly larger, 
investment grade buyers (Table 8 Columns 1-2 and Columns 3-4).  The magnitude of these 
effects is sizeable. For example, from the estimates in Column 2 a buyer who is large gets 9.8 
longer days than the mean of 59 days. Similarly, a buyer who is investment grade gets 7.5 longer 
days than the mean net days.  These results empirically support the hypothesis that trade credit 
terms are used as a means of price discrimination. 
We also find that net days are shorter for buyers located in North America (the majority 
of which are located in the US) relative to buyers located in Europe. One potential explanation 
for this result is that sales in Europe are often cross-border in which case buyers may demand 
longer days to protect against damaged goods and avoid having to challenge suppliers in foreign 
courts.   
When we include supplier fixed effects (thus focusing on the subsample of suppliers with 
multiple contracts within or across buyers), we continue to find that larger and investment grade 
buyers get longer net days (Table 8, Columns 5 and 6). These regressions exclude observations 
from suppliers without multiple contracts. 
When we include buyer fixed effects (Table 8, Columns 3 and 4), we find that longer net 
days are significantly more likely to be extended by smaller suppliers. This is consistent with 
both a market power explanation (small suppliers are squeezed more by buyers) and a bonding 
explanation (small suppliers, ceteris paribus, have to offer better bonds).    
Finally, we also find that investment grade suppliers extend longer net days. This is 
consistent with any of the first three explanations above – clearly, it costs investment grade 
suppliers less to provide a given amount of financing, so in any financing explanation, 
                                                           
8 We do not attach much importance to the industry effect found for the utility sector because it is based on 
observations from only one firm.   14
investment grade suppliers will offer longer terms. For any level of buyer market power, one 
could argue that a supplier for whom providing credit costs less will be squeezed for more. 
Similarly, in order to signal commitment to quality, an investment grade supplier who can raise 
finance at lower cost will offer longer terms. 
Next, we examine the sample of contracts that include an early payment discount. The 
view that discounts are used as a screening mechanism to gauge buyer default risk would suggest 
that smaller and non-investment grade buyers, where default risk tends to be higher, would more 
likely receive discounts. To the extent that it is easier to absorb and diversify default risk for 
large firms, this view would also suggest that small suppliers are more likely to extend discounts. 
On the other hand, if there are fixed costs in screening, one would expect that large suppliers are 
more likely to offer discounts.  
Table 9 shows logit regressions of determinants of early payment discounts for the 
subsample of contracts that offer early payment discounts. The dependent variable takes value 1 
if the contract includes a discount (two-part contract), and 0 otherwise. As before, the first two 
columns present results for regressions with buyer clustered standard errors, the next two 
columns present results for regressions with buyer fixed effects, and the final two columns 
present results for regressions with supplier fixed effects. In the second of each of the regression 
pairs, we drop observations from buyers that never receive discounts, to abstract from the 
possibility that such firms are systematically different from firms that receive discounts. 
We find that discounts are less common for large and investment grade buyers, consistent 
with the screening hypothesis according to which early payment discounts offer suppliers a 
screening mechanism to gauge buyer default risk.  
The buyer fixed effects regressions in columns 3 and 4 indicate that early payment 
discounts are more common from small suppliers. This is consistent with the market power 
hypothesis according to which large buyers demand discounts from small suppliers, despite the 
fact that two-part contracts are generally considered to be more expensive to administer. This 
result is also in line with Burkart, Ellingsen, and Giannetti (2008) who find using U.S. survey 
data that firms that have more buyer market power receive larger early payment discounts. This 
finding is also consistent with the screening view that stipulates that smaller suppliers are more   15
likely to offer discounts as a screening mechanism for nonpayment default because it is more 
difficult for these firms to absorb and diversify default risk. 
The supplier fixed effects regressions in columns 5 and 6 confirm that suppliers are more 
likely to offer early payment discounts to smaller and non-investment grade buyers, consistent 
with the screening hypothesis. Furthermore, these regressions display strong industry effects. It 
should be noted that these regressions are based on a relatively small sample of suppliers because 
only 85% of the suppliers with multiple contracts display variation in whether or not their 
contracts include early payment discounts, indicating a strong supplier fixed effect in whether or 
not firms extend early payment discounts. 
Finally, we analyze the determinants of discount terms for the subsample of contracts that 
offer early payment discounts and for which we have complete information on discount terms 
(including discount period, discount rate, and net days). The results are not materially affected 
when we include firms with incomplete information on discount terms.  
Discount terms appear to be strongly dependent on industry norms. For instance, buyers 
of soft goods and groceries tend to receive the longest discount days. The same industries also 
receive the highest effective rates on two-part contracts. It is also worth emphasizing that a 
surprisingly large fraction of contracts (over 30%) with early payment discounts have a spread 
between net days and discount days of exactly one day, suggesting that discounts are often used 
to encourage prompt payments.   
In Table 10, Columns 1 to 3, we regress our buyer and supplier characteristics on the ratio 
of discount days/net days, for the subsample of contracts that offer early payment discounts.  
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 10 show results from a multinomial logistic regression model, which 
includes the full sample of contracts:  the dependent variable is equal to zero if the contract does 
not include an early payment discount; equal to one if net days less discount days is greater than 
one; and equal to two if net days less discount days is equal to zero or one.   
In all specifications, we find a significant relationship with investment grade buyers, 
contrary to our finding in Table 9 that investment grade buyers are less likely, overall, to receive 
early payment discounts. In the multinomial logit regression, the coefficients on investment   16
grade buyers are significant in both columns (denoting net days less discount days is greater than 
one or net days less discount days is equal to zero or one, respectively), but alter signs between 
specifications. Investment grade buyers are less likely to receive discounts with net days in 
excess of discount days, and more likely to receive discounts with discount days close to net 
days, suggesting that discounts are often used to encourage prompt payments from investment 
grade buyers.   
We also find that buyers in North America are significantly more likely to be offered 
discount days equal to net days.  In addition, supplier characteristics are no longer significant.  
This may suggest that while suppliers in Europe use early payment discounts as a risk 
management tool to encourage early payment from riskier buyers, suppliers in North America 
use discounts as another competitive gesture, or ‘sweetener’, in alternative or in addition to up-
front discounts. 
In unreported regressions, we generally find similar patterns across discount terms 
(including discount period, discount rate, and the effective discount rate
9) in the sense that the 
coefficients on the various firm determinants have the same sign in most specifications, 
suggesting that the different discount terms serve similar purposes and that firms do not 
systematically trade off various terms against each other. This is consistent with the findings by 
Ng et al. (1999). For example, while grocers tend to receive longer discount days relative to net 
days, they also pay higher effective rates. Similarly, investment grade buyers tend to both receive 
longer discount days and pay higher effective rates, conditional upon receiving a discount. 
However, these regressions are hard to interpret because some of the same firm characteristics 
that determine whether or not firms receive early prepayment discounts also appear to affect 
discount terms.  
Overall, we find that trade credit contract terms are jointly determined by supplier and 
buyer characteristics, based on explanations of market power, information asymmetries, and 
alternative financing costs. 
                                                           
9 The effective discount rate is computed as (1/ (1 – discount rate))
360 / (net days – discount days) – 1).).   17
V. Concluding  Remarks 
This paper provides new evidence on the unique role of trade credit as a competitive gesture and 
risk management tool used by suppliers and as a potentially inexpensive source of working 
capital financing for large buyers.   
We use a novel dataset on almost 30,000 supplier contracts for 56 large buyers in Europe 
and North America to document contract terms across buyers and suppliers of varying size and 
investment quality.  
The bilateral, multi-contract nature of our dataset is truly unique and is a major 
improvement on (generally survey based) datasets that have previously been used to study the 
determinants of credit terms used in trade credit. This multi-contract structure of our dataset 
allows us to abstract from unobserved buyer and supplier firm characteristics, something 
previous empirical work has not been able to do. 
We find that the largest and most creditworthy buyers receive contracts with the longest 
maturities, as measured by net days, from smaller, investment grade suppliers, consistent with 
existing trade credit theories.  In particular, these results are consistent with a market power 
explanation (smaller suppliers are squeezed more by large buyers), a screening explanation 
(large and investment grade buyers have lower default risk and need not be screened as much), a 
bonding explanation (small suppliers have to offer better bonds), and a financing explanation 
(investment grade suppliers have lower financing costs, allowing them to offer longer terms). 
In comparison, early payment discounts seem to be used as a risk management tool to 
limit the potential nonpayment risk of trade credit.  In particular, early payment discounts are 
generally offered by smaller, non-investment grade suppliers to smaller and non-investment 
grade buyers. This is consistent with the screening explanation (early payment discounts offer 
suppliers a screening mechanism to gauge buyer default risk). Our result that discounts are more 
common from small suppliers is also consistent with a market power explanation, whereby large 
buyers demand discounts from small suppliers. 
Our results suggest that contract terms are jointly determined by supplier and buyer 
characteristics, based on market power, information asymmetries, and alternative financing costs.  18
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Table 1:  Buyer and Seller Characteristics 
This table reports summary statistics of buyer and supplier characteristics. Sample consists of 29,019 trade credit 
contracts between 56 large buyers and 24,140 suppliers. 
 
 
Panel A: Buyer Characteristics 
 










% of total 
spend 
            
Size >$10B  33  59  24,298  84  612  89 
Size $0.1- 10B  23  41  4,721  16  79  11 
            
Industry auto   9  16  1,615  6  75.8  11 
Industry diversified retail  7  13  9,749  34  193  28 
Industry diversified mfg  16  29  3,824  13  74.3  11 
Industry grocery  4  7  1,630  6  88.5  13 
Industry hard goods retail  9  16  3,146  11  164  24 
Industry soft goods retail  6  11  2,362  8  42.1  6 
Industry technology  3  5  5,306  18  24.2  4 
Industry food & beverages  2  4  682  2  26.7  4 
Industry utility  1  2  705  2  2.47  0 
            
Location: Europe  13  23  12,029  41  241  35 
Location: North America  43  77  16,990  59  450  65 
            
Investment Grade: No  14  25  4,514  16  42.9  7 
Investment Grade: Yes  42  75  24,505  84  570  93 
            
 
Panel B: Supplier Characteristics: 
 










% of total 
spend 
            
Size >$2B  2,727  11  5,772  20  531  77 
Size $0.1-2B  7,821  32  9,549  33  142  21 
Size <$0.1B  13,590  56  13,698  47  17.9  3 
            
Investment Grade: No  16,391  68  18,655  65  319  46 
Investment Grade: Yes  7,713  32  10,043  35  372  54 
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Table 2:  Contract Characteristics 
 
This table reports summary statistics of trade credit contract characteristics. Sample consists of 29,019 trade credit 
contracts between 56 large buyers and 24,140 suppliers. Early payment discounts are offered on 3,717 of these 
contracts. 
 
   N Mean  Median  Min  Max  Std  Dev 
 
Panel A: All Contracts: 
 
Spend (millions)  29,019  23.8  3.47  .0004  6,520  111.0 
Spend ≤ $1M  29,019  0.28  0  0  1   
Spend >$1M - ≤ $4M  29,019  0.25  0  0  1   
Spend >$4M - ≤$15M 29,019  0.22  0  0  1   
Spend  >$15M  29,019  0.25  0  0  1   
            
Net Days  29,019  59.2  60  1  120  26.1 
Net Days  0 – 30  29,019  0.25  0  0  1   
Net Days  31 – 60  29,019  0.37  0  0  1   
Net Days  61 – 90  29,019  0.24  0  0  1   
Net Days  >90  29,019  0.11  0  0  1   
            
Discount offered  3,717  0.13  0  0  1   
            
 
Panel B: Subsample of Contracts that offer an early payment  discount: 
 
Discount Days  3,462  30.43  30  1  180  20.09 
Discount Days 0 – 30  3,462  0.64  1  0  1   
Discount Days 31 – 60  3,462  0.27  0  0  1   
Discount Days >60  3,462  0.09  0  0  1   
            
Discount rate (%)  3,707  2  2  .02  11.5  0.09 
Discount ≤1% 3,707  36  0  0  1   
Discount >1% - ≤2% 3,707  56  1  0  1   
Discount > 2%  3,707  8  0  0  1   
            
Ratio of Discount to Net Days  2,634  0.63  0.6  0.02  1  0.28 
            
Effective Interest Rate  2,584  0.53  0.27  0.02  1  0.38 
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Table 3:  Distribution of Buyer and Seller Characteristics by Contract Characteristics 
 
This table reports the distribution (in percentages) of trade credit contract terms by buyer and supplier characteristics. 
Sample consists of 29,019 trade credit contracts between 56 large buyers and 24,140 suppliers. NA denotes North 
America. 
 
  Spend (%)  Net Days (%)  Location 
  < $1M  $1-4M  >$4-15M  > $15M  0-30  31-60  61-90  91+  Europe  NA 
Buyer Characteristics: 
                    
Size >$10B  32  23  20  25  20  38  29  13  46  54 
Size $0.1- 10B  5  35  33  26  52  40  8  0  18  82 
                    
Industry auto  0  15  28  57  20  53  20  7  59  41 
Industry diversified retail  23  37  22  17  10  13  50  26  84  16 
Industry diversified mfg  6  29  36  29  47  34  17  1  0  100 
Industry grocery  11  25  18  47  42  54  3  0  84  16 
Industry hard goods retail  0  15  29  57  21  52  24  4  3  97 
Industry soft goods retail  26  23  22  29  85  14  1  1  0  100 
Industry technology  74  9  10  7  8  88  3  0  0  100 
Industry food & beverages  28  34  21  17  27  30  12  31  100  0 
Industry utility  73  18  6  4  54  9  36  0  100  0 
                    
Location: Europe  26  33  20  20  11  19  46  23  100  0 
Location: North America  29  19  23  29  37  53  10  1  0  100 
                    
Investment Grade: No  18  19  31  33  67  30  2  0  48  52 
Investment Grade: Yes  30  26  20  24  19  40  29  12  6  94 
 
Supplier Characteristics: 
                    
Size: >$2B  5  11  18  65  33  39  21  8  30  70 
Size: $0.1-2B  5  89  48  38  34  32  24  11  39  61 
Size: <$0.1B  53  41  6  0  18  43  27  12  48  52 
                    
Investment Grade: No  28  26  23  23  27  40  24  10  43  57 
Investment Grade: Yes  27  22  21  30  23  37  27  12  41  59   24
Table 4:  Distribution of Buyer and Seller Characteristics by Discount 
Characteristics 
 
This table reports the distribution of trade credit contract terms by buyer and supplier characteristics for the 
subsample of 3,717 contracts that offer an early payment discount. 
 
  Full 
Sample 
Subsample of Contracts that Offer an Early Payment Discount 
Discount Rate (%)  Discount Days (%)  Discount to 
Net days 
Ratio (%)    Discount 
(%)  0-1% 1-2% >  2%  0-30  31-60  61+ 
 
Buyer Characteristics: 
Size  >$10B  10  35  58 7 64  33 3  64 
Size  $0.1-  10B  26  37 52 11 78 21  2  60 
            
Industry  auto  19  21 50 29  100 0  0  35 
Industry  diversified  retail  5  34  66 0 94 5  1  43 
Industry  diversified  mfg  13  67  30 3 95 4  1  44 
Industry  grocery  25  31 48 22 84 15  0  87 
Industry hard goods retail  58  35  60  5  54  42  4  68 
Industry  soft  goods  retail  8  5 86 9 25  75 0  95 
Industry  technology  0  . . . . . .  . 
Industry  food  &  beverages  0  . . . . . .  . 
Industry  utility  0  . . . . . .  . 
            
Location:  Europe  4  19 44 37 70 28  2  80 
Location:  North  America  19  38  58 4 67  30 3  61 
            
Investment  Grade:  No  25  37  60 3 76  21 2  54 
Investment  Grade:  Yes  11  35 54 11 64 33  3  66 
 
Supplier Characteristics: 
Size >$2B  27  34  58  7  66  31  3  65 
Size $0.1-2B  17  38  54  8  67  30  2  63 
Size  <$0.1B  4  32 58 11  80 19  1  57 
              
Investment Grade: No  13  37  55  9  69  29  2  63 
Investment Grade: Yes  12  33  59  7  67  30  3  64 
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Table 5:  Testable Hypotheses Based on Trade Credit Theories 
 
This table summarizes the testable hypotheses for trade credit terms (net days and discount offered) that 
follow from the four, not mutually exclusive explanations for trade credit offered in the text: as a method of 
financing; as a means of price discrimination or market power; as a bond assuring buyers of product 
quality; or as a screening mechanism to gauge buyer default risk. Panel A summarizes the role of supplier 
and buyer characteristics in explaining differences in contract maturity as measured by net days. In this 
panel, − denotes shorter net days; + denotes longer net days; and 0 denotes no effect on net days. Panel B 
summarizes the role of supplier and buyer characteristics in explaining whether or not early payment 
discounts are offered. In this panel, − denotes discounts less common; + denotes discounts more common; 
and 0 denotes no effect on likelihood of discounts. 
 
Panel A: Net days 
 
  Financing Market  Power Bonding  Screening 
Supplier Characteristics:       
High turnover/perishable goods  − 0  − 0 
Small in size  − +  +  0 
Investment grade  +  +  +  0 
Buyer Characteristics:       
Large in size  0  +  0  + 
Investment grade  0  0  0  + 
 
 
Panel B: Early payment discount 
 
  Financing Market  Power Bonding  Screening 
Supplier Characteristics:       
Small in size  0  +  0  + 
Buyer Characteristics:       
Small in size  0  0  0  + 
Non-Investment grade  0  0  0  + 
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Table 6: Summary Statistics of Regression Variables 
 
This table reports summary statistics of the main regression variables. Sample consists of 29,019 trade 
credit contracts between 56 large buyers and 24,140 suppliers. Early payment discounts are offered on 
3,717 of these contracts. 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
Complete sample:       
Log  net  days  28,187 3.9468 0.6138  0  5.4806 
Discount  dummy  29,019 0.1281 0.3342  0  1 
       
Subsample of contracts with early payment discount:      
Discount days  3,462  30.4330 20.0922 1  180 
Discount  rate  3,707  0.0173 0.0084 0.0002 0.1150 
Discount days/Net days  2,634  0.6299  0.2815  0.0167  1 
Effective  rate  2,584  0.5332 0.3813 0.0169  1 
       
Buyer characteristics:       
Buyer large size  29,019  0.8373  0.3691  0  1 
Buyer small size  29,019  0.1627  0.3691  0  1 
Buyer investment grade  29,019  0.8444  0.3624  0  1 
Buyer  North  America  29,019 0.5855 0.4926  0  1 
Industry  auto  29,019 0.0557 0.2293  0  1 
Industry  diversified  retail  29,019 0.3360 0.4723  0  1 
Industry  diversified  mfg  29,019 0.1318 0.3383  0  1 
Industry  grocery  29,019 0.0562 0.2303  0  1 
Industry hard goods retail  29,019  0.1084  0.3109  0  1 
Industry soft goods retail  29,019  0.0814  0.2734  0  1 
Industry technology  29,019 0.1828 0.3865  0  1 
Industry food and beverages  29,019  0.0235  0.1515  0  1 
Industry  utility  29,019 0.0243 0.1540  0  1 
       
Supplier characteristics:       
Supplier  large  size  29,019 0.1989 0.3992  0  1 
Supplier medium size  29,019  0.3291  0.4699  0  1 
Supplier  small  size  29,019 0.4720 0.4992  0  1 
Supplier investment grade  29,019  0.3461  0.4757  0  1 
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Table 7: Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 
This table reports correlations between the main regression variables. Panel A presents correlations 
between the dependent variables; Panel B presents correlations between the explanatory and dependent 
variables; and Panel C presents correlations between explanatory variables. Sample consists of 29,019 trade 
credit contracts between 56 large buyers and 24,140 suppliers. Early payment discounts are offered on 
3,717 of these contracts. 
 




days  Discount days/net days 
Discount days/net days  -0.19*   




Panel B: Explanatory and Dependent Variables 
 
  Full Sample  Subsample w/Discount 









        
Buyer large size  0.26*  -0.18*  0.09*  -0.10 
Buyer small size  -0.26*  0.18*  -0.09*  0.06 
Buyer investment grade  0.30* -0.15* 0.20*  0.13* 
Buyer North America  -0.37* 0.22* -0.18*  -0.32* 
Industry auto  0.00 0.04*  -0.17* -0.00 
Industry diversified retail  0.35*  -0.17*  -0.33*  -0.10 
Industry diversified mfg  -0.13*  0  -0.32*  -0.00 
Industry grocery  -0.17* 0.09*  0.35*  0.33* 
Industry hard goods retail  -0.00 0.47* 0.15* -0.08* 
Industry soft goods retail  -0.25* -0.04*  0.33*  0.11* 
Industry technology  -0.02*  -0.18*  .  . 
Industry food and beverage  0.05*  -0.06*  .  . 
Industry utility  -0.07*  -0.06*  .  . 
Supplier large size  -0.11*  0.21*  0.06*  0.10* 
Supplier medium size  -0.10*  0.08*  0.00  -0.12* 
Supplier small size  0.18* -0.25* -0.08*  0.04 
Supplier investment grade  0.03* -0.02*  0.02  0.04 
         Note: Asterisks indicate significance at 1% 
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Panel C:  Explanatory Variables 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) 
                    
Buyer  large  size  (1)  1.00                 
Buyer  small  size  (2)  -1.00*  1.00                
Buyer  investment  grade  (3) -0.00  0.00  1.00               
North  America  (4)  -0.21*  0.21*  -0.31*  1.00              
Ind:  auto  (5)    -0.15*  0.15*  -0.10*  -0.08*  1.00             
Ind:  diversified  retail  (6)  0.17*  -0.17*  0.17*  -0.62*  -0.17*  1.00            
Ind:  diversified  mfg(7)  -0.38*  0.38*  -0.06*  0.33*  -0.09*  -0.28*  1.00           
Ind:  grocery  (8)  -0.70*  0.70*  -0.01  0.17*  0.26*  -0.08*  0.37*  1.00          
Ind: hard goods retail (9)  -0.03*  0.03*  -0.04*  0.27*  -0.08*  -0.25*  -0.14*  -0.11*  1.00               
Ind: soft goods retail (10)  -0.07*  0.07*  -0.32*  0.25*  -0.07*  -0.21*  -0.12*  -0.09*  -0.10*  1.00             
Ind: technology (11)  0.21*  -0.21*  0.15*  0.40*  -0.11*  -0.34*  -0.18*  -0.15*  -0.16*  -0.14*  1.00           
Ind:  food&beverages  (12)  -0.03* 0.03* -0.04* -0.18* -0.04* -0.11* -0.06* -0.05* -0.05* -0.05* -0.07*  1.00         
Ind: utility (13)  0.07*  -0.07* 0.07* -0.19* -0.04* -0.11* -0.06* -0.05* -0.06* -0.05* -0.07* -0.02* 1.00       
Supplier  large  size  (14)  -0.00  0.00 -0.12*  0.12* 0.07*  -0.10*  0.03* -0.01 0.23*  -0.03*  -0.15* 0.00 -0.06* 1.00     
Supplier  medium  size  (15)  -0.12* 0.12* -0.09* 0.04* 0.11* -0.05* 0.13* 0.02* 0.10* 0.04* -0.20* -0.01 -0.07* -0.35*  1.00   
Supplier small size (16)  0.12*  -0.12*  0.18*  -0.13*  -0.16*  0.12*  -0.14*  -0.01  -0.28*  -0.01  0.31*  0.01  0.11*  -0.47*  -0.66*  1.00 
Supplier  investment  grade  (17)  0.08* -0.08*  0.00  -0.02* 0.02* 0.02* -0.03* -0.07* 0.02* -0.05* 0.03* -0.02*  0.00  0.22* -0.11* -0.08* 
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Table 8: Log net days 
Dependent variable is the logarithm of net days on the contract. Standard errors in regressions (1) and (2) are corrected for clustering at the buyer level. 
Regressions (3) and (4) include buyer fixed effects. Regressions (5) and (6) include supplier fixed effects and are estimated based on the subsample of suppliers 
that have multiple contracts. Regressions (2), (4) and (6) include only trade credit contracts without discounts. Standard errors are reported between brackets. ***, 
**, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Dependent variable: Log net days  Buyer clustered  Buyer FE  Supplier FE 
        
    Without discount    Without discount    Without discount 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Buyer large size  0.389***  0.391***      0.225***  0.170*** 
 (0.102)  (0.110)      (0.025)  (0.031) 
Buyer investment grade  0.242**  0.295***      0.217***  0.260*** 
 (0.102)  (0.110)      (0.024)  (0.028) 
Buyer North America  -0.485***  -0.554***      -0.446***  -0.502*** 
 (0.167)  (0.184)      (0.043)  (0.054) 
Industry diversified retail  -0.072  -0.136      0.042  -0.053 
 (0.127)  (0.155)      (0.060)  (0.071) 
Industry diversified mfg  0.094  0.123      0.183***  0.173*** 
 (0.165)  (0.185)      (0.052)  (0.060) 
Industry grocery  -0.764***  -0.760***      -0.529***  -0.521*** 
 (0.136)  (0.163)      (0.069)  (0.084) 
Industry hard goods retail  0.140  0.126      0.084  0.031 
 (0.146)  (0.162)      (0.060)  (0.072) 
Industry soft goods retail  -0.263*  -0.230      -0.118  -0.091 
 (0.143)  (0.161)      (0.086)  (0.097) 
Industry technology  -0.051  -0.047      -0.231***  -0.277*** 
 (0.304)  (0.321)      (0.062)  (0.069) 
Industry food and beverage  -0.148  -0.199      0.090  0.033 
 (0.142)  (0.157)      (0.131)  (0.141) 
Industry utility  -0.806***  -0.872***      -0.551***  -0.652*** 
 (0.122)  (0.156)      (0.119)  (0.128) 
Supplier large size  -0.148  -0.143  -0.059***  -0.068***     
  (0.126) (0.138) (0.008) (0.008)     
Supplier medium size  -0.140  -0.155  -0.041***  -0.047***     
  (0.124) (0.134) (0.006) (0.006)     
Supplier investment grade  0.008  0.006  0.017***  0.017***     
  (0.016) (0.017) (0.005) (0.005)     
        
Number  of  buyers  56 56 56 56 56 56 
Number  of  suppliers  24,006 22,028 24,006 22,028 2,267  2,051 
Number  of  observations  28,187 25,298 28,187 25,298 6,448  5,321 
R-squared  0.337 0.335 0.036 0.030 0.276 0.286   30
Table 9: Discounts 
 
Dependent variable is a dummy variable that take a value of one if the trade credit contract includes a discount (two-part contract), and zero otherwise. 
Regression estimates are based on a logit model. Standard errors in regressions (1) through (2) are corrected for clustering at the buyer level. Regressions (3) and 
(4) include buyer fixed effects. Regressions (5) through (6) include supplier fixed effects and are estimated based on the subsample of suppliers that have 
multiple contracts. Regressions (2), (4) and (6) exclude buyers with no discounts ever. Several industries do not have firms with discounts and are dropped from 
estimation. Standard errors are reported between brackets. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: Discount  Buyer clustered  Buyer FE  Supplier FE 
    w/o no discount    w/o no discount    w/o no discount 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Buyer large size  -1.653**  -0.854*      -1.650***  -1.269*** 
  (0.686)  (0.502)    (0.174)  (0.190) 
Buyer investment grade  -0.814  -0.888*     -0.668***  -0.651*** 
  (0.517)  (0.535)    (0.139)  (0.157) 
Buyer North America  1.666  0.716      3.318***  3.528*** 
  (1.274)  (1.141)    (0.378)  (0.509) 
Industry diversified retail  0.922  -0.752      2.452***  0.624 
  (1.377)  (1.034)    (0.415)  (0.512) 
Industry diversified mfg  -0.010  -1.619*      -0.157  -1.471*** 
  (1.080)  (0.955)    (0.334)  (0.460) 
Industry grocery  3.191*  -0.073      5.520***  3.182*** 
  (1.655)  (1.118)    (0.546)  (0.678) 
Industry hard goods retail  2.916***  0.556      3.637***  1.417*** 
  (0.910)  (1.049)    (0.371)  (0.466) 
Industry soft goods retail  -0.086  -1.184      0.575  -0.592 
  (1.136)  (1.007)    (0.750)  (0.850) 
Supplier large size  1.147***  0.553  -0.225**  -0.225**     
  (0.340) (0.415) (0.095) (0.095)     
Supplier medium size  0.697**  0.153  -0.322***  -0.322***     
  (0.286) (0.329) (0.083) (0.083)     
Supplier investment grade  -0.279***  -0.097 -0.065 -0.065     
  (0.094) (0.107) (0.064) (0.064)     
        
Number  of  buyers  56 34 34 34 56 34 
Number  of  suppliers  24,140  7,927 7,927 7,927  399  305 
Number  of  observations  29,019 10,604 10,604 10,604  2,067  1,433 
   31
Table 10: Discount Terms 
 
Dependent variable is the ratio of discount days to net days in regressions (1)-(3). Columns (4) and (5) report results of a multinomial logit regression where the 
dependent variable takes a value of 2 if net days minus discount days is less than or equal to 1, a value of 1 if net days minus discount days is more than 1, and a 
value of 0 if the contract offers no discount (which we set as the base outcome). Standard errors in regression (1) and the multinomial regression reported in 
columns (4) and (5) are corrected for clustering at the buyer level. Regression (2) includes buyer fixed effects and regression (3) includes supplier fixed effects 
and is estimated based on the subsample of suppliers that have multiple contracts. Several industries do not have firms with discounts and are dropped from 
estimation in regressions (1) to (3). We also exclude contracts with missing discount or net days information from the regressions in (1) to (3). Standard errors 
are reported between brackets. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable:  Discount days/Net days Multinomial  logit 
      Net days minus 
discount days>1 
Net days minus 
discount days<=1 
  Buyer clustered  Buyer FE  Supplier FE  Buyer clustered  Buyer clustered 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Buyer large size  0.012    0.002  -1.383*  -1.787** 
  (0.112)  (0.030)  (0.741)  (0.814) 
Buyer investment grade  0.082*    0.148***  -1.139**  2.578*** 
  (0.049)  (0.033)  (0.555)  (0.993) 
Buyer  North  America  0.220***    0.380*** 1.369 5.768*** 
  (0.048)  (0.078)  (1.371)  (1.508) 
Industry diversified retail  0.074    -0.157  0.819  4.318*** 
  (0.058)  (0.101)  (1.398)  (1.609) 
Industry diversified mfg  0.049    -0.081  0.128  2.770* 
  (0.072)  (0.091)  (1.081)  (1.532) 
Industry grocery  0.611***    0.302***  1.683  12.095*** 
  (0.057)  (0.105)  (1.778)  (1.999) 
Industry hard goods retail  0.261***    -0.150  2.786***  6.765*** 
  (0.093)  (0.099)  (0.943)  (1.351) 
Industry soft goods retail  0.539***    0.331*  -3.911***  5.636*** 
  (0.070)  (0.174)  (1.130)  (1.503) 
Supplier large size  -0.016  0.010    0.993***  0.980 
  (0.032)  (0.013)  (0.336)  (0.603) 
Supplier medium size  -0.026  0.010    0.563*  0.509 
  (0.026)  (0.012)  (0.309)  (0.466) 
Supplier investment grade  0.006  0.001    -0.262**  -0.206 
  (0.017)  (0.009)  (0.105)  (0.132) 
       
Number  of  buyers 34 34 28  56 
Number of suppliers  2,080  2,080  531  24,140 
Number  of  observations  2,584 2,584 1,035  29,019 
R-squared  0.440 0.008 0.254  0.361   32
Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Name  Variable Definition 
  
Net days  Natural logarithm of net days of the contract in number of days. 
Discount days  Natural logarithm of discount days of the contract in number of days. 
Discount rate  Discount percentage 
Discount days / Net days  Ratio of number of discount days to number of net days 
Effective rate  Effective rate computed as   1 ) 1 ( 1
) /( 360  
 days discount days net rate discount  
Buyer large size  Dummy variable that takes a value of one when the total sales of the buyer exceeds 
US$ 10 billion, and zero otherwise. 
Buyer small size  Dummy variable that takes a value of one when the total sales of the buyer is smaller than 
US$ 10 billion, and zero otherwise. 
Buyer investment grade  Dummy variable that takes a value of one when the buyer is investment grade, and zero 
otherwise. 
Buyer North America  Dummy variable that takes a value of one when the location of the buyer is North 
America (Canada or US) and zero when the location of the buyer is elsewhere (UK or 
Continental Europe). 
Industry auto  Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the buyer is active in the auto industry, and 
zero otherwise. 
Industry diversified retail  Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the buyer is active in the diversified retail 
industry, and zero otherwise. 
Industry diversified mfg  Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the buyer is active in the diversified 
manufacturing industry, and zero otherwise. 
Industry grocery  Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the buyer is active in the groceries industry, 
and zero otherwise. 
Industry hard goods retail  Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the buyer is active in the hard goods retail 
industry, and zero otherwise. 
Industry soft goods retail  Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the buyer is active in the soft goods retail 
industry, and zero otherwise. 
Supplier large size  Dummy variable that takes a value of one when the total sales of the supplier exceeds 
US$ 2 billion, and zero otherwise. 
Supplier medium size  Dummy variable that takes a value of one when the total sales of the supplier is between 
US$ 100 million and US$ 2 billion, and zero otherwise. 
Supplier small size  Dummy variable that takes a value of one when the total sales of the supplier is less than 
US$ 100 million, and zero otherwise. 
Supplier investment grade  Dummy variable that takes a value of one when the supplier is investment grade, and zero 
otherwise. 
 